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RED LION IN WINTER: FIRST AMENDMENT AND EQUAL
PROTECTION CONCERNS IN THE ALLOCATION OF DIRECT
BROADCAST SATELLITE PUBLIC INTEREST CHANNELS
Jeffrey S. Hops*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") may soon issue regula-
tions implementing Section 25 of the Cable Tele-
vision Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992 ("1992 Cable Act"),' specifying the public
interest obligations required of Direct Broadcast
Satellite ("DBS") service providers under the Act.
Section 25 has two major components. First, Sec-
tion 25(a) requires DBS service providers to sup-
ply public interest programming on channels they
select for broadcast. 2 In addition, Section 25(b)
requires DBS providers to set aside four to seven
* B.A. Swarthmore College 1983; J.D. New York
University, 1991; M.P.A. Princeton University, 1991. Mr.
Hops was most recently Director of Government Relations
for the Alliance for Community Media, a Washington, D.C.
based trade association.
I Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 25, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 335 (1994)).
2 Section 25(a) states:
The Commission shall, within 180 days after [October 5,
1992], initiate a rulemaking proceeding to impose, on
providers of direct broadcast satellite service, public in-
terest or other requirements for providing video pro-
gramming. Any regulations prescribed pursuant to such
rulemaking shall, at a minimum, apply the access to
broadcast time requirement of Section 312(a) (7) of this
title and the use of facilities requirements of Section 315
[of this title] to providers of direct broadcast satellite
service providing video programming. Such proceeding
also shall examine the opportunities that the establish-
ment of direct broadcast satellite service provides for the
principle of localism under this chapter of the Cable
Act, and the methods by which such principle may be
served through technological and other developments
in, or regulation of, such service.
47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (1994).
3 Section 25(b), in its relevant part, provides:
(1) CHANNEL CAPACITY REQUIRED.- The Commis-
sion shall require, as a condition of any provision, initial
authorization, or authorization renewal for a provider of
direct broadcast satellite service providing video pro-
gramming, that the provider of such service reserve a
percent of their transmission capacity for "non-
commercial educational and informational pro-
gramming" over which the DBS provider may ex-
ercise no editorial control.
3
This regulation has been anticipated for quite
some time. The rulemaking process was com-
menced in 1993.4 In September of that year, how-
ever, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia struck down Section 25 as
unconstitutional. 5 Three years later, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals overturned
the District Court's ruling, thereby reviving the
provision.6
portion of its channel capacity, equal to not less than 4
percent nor more than 7 percent, exclusively for non-
commercial programming of an educational or informa-
tional nature.
(3) PRICES, TERMS, AND CONDITIONS; EDITORIAL
CONTROL. - A provider of direct broadcast satellite ser-
vice shall meet the requirements of this subsection by
making channel capacity available to national educa-
tional programming suppliers, upon reasonable prices,
terms, and conditions, as determined by the Commis-
sion.... The provider of direct broadcast satellite ser-
vice shall not exercise any editorial control over any
video programming provided pursuant to this subsec-
tion.
47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1994).
4 See In re Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable Tel-
evision Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,
Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Service Obligations, 8 FCC
Rcd. 1589, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (1993).
5 See Daniels Cablevision v. United States, 835 F. Supp. 1,
12 (D.D.C. 1993). The plaintiffs in Daniels, cable television
system owner/operators and programmers, argued that sev-
eral provisions of the 1992 Cable Act (including Section 25)
"unconstitutionally interfere[d] with their First Amendment
right to 'speak' as they wish[ed] through the cable television
systems they own[ed], control[led] or use[d], to the audi-
ences of their choice." Id. at 3-4.
6 See Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, 93
F.3d 957, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1996) [hereinafter "Time Warner
I"].
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Arguably, Section 25's two subsections comport
precisely with the First Amendment, because of
the statute's requirement that DBS providers
transmit specific content on their systems. The
statute appears to require that commercial pro-
gramming providers permit the use of their chan-
nels for certain political purposes and set aside ca-
pacity for use by others in order to meet public
interest obligations. 7
Requirements to serve the public interest, and/
or requirement to provide a noncommercial eclu-
cational/informational programming set-aside
may improve information flows and democratic
discourse in the electronic mass media, but are
they constitutional? Although judicial review ulti-
mately resolved the conflict in favor of the stat-
ute's constitutionality, these challenges point to
an area of deep division in First Amendmentjuris-
prudence; the division between the right of the
speaker/owner to control, and the right of the au-
dience/listeners to hear and know. This hoary
debate appeared most recently before the United
States Supreme Court in Denver Area Educational
Television Consortium, Inc. v. FCOs ("DAETC") and
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC0 (" Turner
I'), and is poised to surface again in Arkansas Ed-
ucational Television Commission v. Forbes, " a case ar-
gued before the United States Supreme Court in
the 1997-98 term.
There is no doubt that information flows on po-
litically relevant matters can and should be im-
proved, as financial resources significantly impact
our ability as a society to gather, organize and dis-
seminate information. As A.J. Liebling observed,
"[f]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to
7 Se generally 47 U.S.C. § 335(b) (1)-(3) (1994).
8 See Denver Area Educ. Tele. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
116 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (1996) (holding that Section 10(c) of
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 violates the First Amendment).
9 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174,
1184 (1997) [hereinafter "Turner I1"] (ruling that must-carry
provisions do not violate the First Amendment).
1) See generally Arkansas Educ. Tel. Comm'n v. Forbes, 93
F.3d 497 (8"' Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 1243 (1997).
1 l Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Conveiging
First Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media,
104 YALE L. J. 1719, 1721 n.7 (1995) (citing A.J. LnEBLING,
THE PRESS 32 (1981) [hereinafter "Krattenmaker"].
12 FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S.
775, 799 (1978) (quoting Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
13 See, e.g., Turner II, 117 S. Ct. at 1184 (holding that
"under the intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to con-
tent-neutral regulations, must-carry would be sustained if it
those who own one."' Moreover, information is
a commodity. Most content creation, whether in
the form of The New. York Times or "Oprah" is ac-
complished on a for-profit basis, with stockhold-
ers expecting a return on their investment. Own-
ers of private media transmit what will attract
audiences, regardless of the content's merit or
contribution to democratic self-governance.
At the same time, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized harm to full and free information flows,
particularly "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic
sources,"'12 as ajusticiable First Amendment prob-
lem that may supersede market outcomes. Conse-
quently, the Supreme Court has used intermedi-
ate scrutiny' 3 to examine access regulation in the
video marketplace. Like the Court in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC,14 constitutional schol-
ars have acknowledged that the free market will
not by itself always provide information necessary
to ensure a robust marketplace of ideas. Professor
Cass Sunstein of the University of Chicago, per-
haps the foremost authority of this "Madisonian"
school of thought, has advocated that speech rele-
vant to self-governance should be given an ex-
plicit governmental preference in regulation of
the mass media.'
5
As the old saying goes, "even the devil can
quote Scripture." It is therefore no surprise that
the commercial mass media, particularly televi-
sion broadcasters, have used wielded their First
Amendment sword to ward off the FCC's and
Congress' attempts to encourage programming
related to self-governance. 16 In the industry's
view, the First Amendment guarantees that own-
were shown to further an important or substantial govern-
mental interest unrelated to the suppression of free
speech...").
14 395 U.S. 367 (1969) ("Red Lion"); see, e.g., ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOIIN, FREE SPEECH AND ITs RELATION TO SELF-GOVERN-
MENT (1948).
15 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Emerging Media Technology
and the First Amendment: The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104
YALE L.J. 1757 (1995).
At least part of the First Amendment inquiry should turn
on the relationship between what broadcasters provide
and what a well-functioning democracy requires. If we
have any sympathy for Brandeis' judgment - shared by
Madison - that 'the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people,' we will acknowledge that the marketplace
model may not perform an adequate educative role, and
that a system of free markets may well disserve demo-
cratic ideals (citation omitted).
Id. at 1780.
', See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 11, at 1727 (citing
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ers of commercial mass media have exclusive con-
trol over their licenses and facilities - no more
and no less. While this "high-road" argument
might have merit in the context of "Face the Na-
tion" and "60 Minutes," (where governmental in-
terference would be clearly inappropriate because
of the political content and information dissemi-
nated), it seems disingenuous when applying this
line of thought to programming with almost no
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific"
value. 
17
Red Lion and Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo18 are generally cited as emblematic of the
Supreme Court's struggle to determine who
"owns" the First Amendment. Red Lion stands for
the principle that legislative bodies may make laws
and regulations to alleviate information market
failure, vesting ultimate First Amendment rights
with the body politic.1 9 Tornillo, on the other
hand, asserts that freedom of the press is insepara-
ble from ownership. 20 Under Tornillo, the fact
that the federal government grants a license to oc-
cupy and use a specific radio frequency does not
ipso facto give that entity the right to promulgate
content requirements as a condition of license,
even if the favored programming is conceded to
be meritorious.
Red Lion notwithstanding, Tornillo is function-
ally the law of the land, even for broadcast televi-
sion.2 1 The Commission has never interfered
with a television station's programming schedule
to guarantee access to a particular speaker. Like-
wise, the Commission has only on rare occasions
revoked a license because of failure to broadcast
in the public interest.2 2 Yet the Commission occa-
sionally threatens to let Red Lion out of its cage in
order to promote "voluntary" compliance with
some of its initiatives, relying on its power to re-
new (or not renew) licenses its only legal enforce-
ment mechanism.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (citation omitted) to illustrate the
government's public interest justification for encouraging
improved programming); Daniel L. Brenner, Ownership and
Content Regulation in Merging and Emerging Media, 45 DEPAUL
L. REv. 1009, 1027 (1996) [hereinafter "Brenner"] (stating
that large companies are often better-suited to fight for their
First Amendment freedoms).
17 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
18 See generally 418 U.S. 241 (1973) [hereinafter
"Tornillo"].
19 See generally Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367.
20 See generally Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
21 Even the harshest critics of Red Lion concede that the
Commission has never energetically pursued the doctrine.
Therefore, Section 25, and in particular Section
25(b), is unique in that rather than relying on
general exhortations to serve the public interest, a
DBS programming provider is required to set a
quantifiable amount of bandwidth aside for non-
commercial educational and information pro-
gramming chosen by an independent third party.
This note will examine Red Lion, Tornillo and
the structure of Section 25. This note will con-
clude with a modest assertion: that Red Lion,
Tornillo and the DBS statute should be under-
stood and adjudicated using an equal protection
analysis, in addition to a First Amendment analy-
sis.
II. DIRECT CONTENT CONTROL-
RED LION
Information is the raw material of justice. For
instance, fair trials cannot take place in the ab-
sence of adequate discovery. The police power of
the State can compel the production of informa-
tion in order to promote justice and protect the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens. Election-
disclosure laws require a political candidate or
party organization not only to speak, but to speak
truthfully. The Supreme Court has not regarded
any of these illustrations as either forced speech
23
or constitutionally impermissible content-based
restrictions, although these statutory require-
ments are content-based by definition.
As the eminent telecommunications law expert
Henry Geller pointed out, the current system of
licensing and trusteeship is based on the history
of radio regulation; the present system is just one
of several options, which included licensing fre-
quencies to be shared among multiple entities
during the course of a broadcast day or week, that
See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 11, at 1729 n.57 (stating
that "FCC efforts to create quality programs that broadcasters
do not wish to air, while sporadic, have been unsuccess-
ful...") (citation omitted).
22 See Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace
Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV 207, 231
(1982) [hereinafter "Fowler"] (stating that "the Commis-
sion's bark has been worse than its bite.") (citation omitted).
23 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). The
Supreme Court stated, "[w]e long have realized that signifi-
cant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort
that compelled disclosure [or forced speech] imposes cannot




Congress considered in 1927 and 1934.24 The re-
sult of Congressional debate was a classic political
tradeoff; in exchange for local monopolies and
free spectrum, broadcasters were instructed by
the Commission to program their frequencies in
the public interest.25 Those public interest obli-
gations included Section 315(a) 26 (access by polit-
ical candidates) and the personal attack and edi-
torial rules.
27
Red Lion Broadcasting challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Commission's personal attack and
broadcast editorial rules, which the Commission
tried and failed to revise as recently as August
1997.28 The Red Lion Court found an explicit
duty under Section 315 to "afford reasonable op-
portunity for the discussion of conflicting views
on issues of public importance."29 The Court em-
phasized that a license to broadcast or monopo-
lize a frequency was not of itself a First Amend-
ment right:
[t] here is nothing in the First Amendment which pre-
vents the Government from requiring a licensee to
share his frequency with others and to conduct himself
as a proxy or fiduciary with obligations to present those
views and voices which are representative of his com-
munity and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves.
3 0
At the same time, the Court emphasized that
outright censorship was stricdy forbidden by Sec-
tion 326 of the 1934 Act. 31 Nonetheless, the
24 See Henry Geller, Turner Broadcasting, The First Amend-
ment, and the New Electronic Delivery Systems, 95 MICH.
TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1995) [hereinafter "Gel-
ler"]; see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390-91.
25 See Geller, supra note 24, at 5, 53.
26 In its relevant portion, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broad-
casting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all
other such candidates for that office in the use of such
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall
have no power of censorship over the material broadcast
under the provisions of this section. No obligation is im-
posed.., upon any licensee to allow the use of its station
by any such candidate.
Id.
27 When considered by the Red Lion Court, the rules had
been amended to read:
Personal attacks; political editorials.
(a) When, during the presentation of views on a contro-
versial issue of public importance, an attack is made
upon the honesty, character, integrity or like personal
qualities of an identified person or group, the licensee
shall, within a reasonable time ... offer.., a reasonable
opportunity to respond over the licensee's facilities.
(c) Where a licensee, in an editorial, (i) endorses or (ii)
opposes a legally qualified candidate or candidates, the
Court stated that the scarcity of radio frequencies
permitted the Government to put modest re-
straints on licensees' control of their stations, in
favor of others whose views should be given the
opportunity to be heard:
... the people as a whole retain their interest in free
speech by radio and their collective right to have the
medium function consistently with the ends and pur-
poses of the First Amendment. It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters,
which is paramount .... It is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than
to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private li-
censee. '[S]peech concerning public affairs is more
than self-expression; it is the essence of self-govern-
ment.' It is the right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here. That right
may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress
or by the FCC.
3 2
The underlying issue in Red Lion is whether or
not physical scarcity of spectrum is a legitimate ra-
tionale for a relaxed level of scrutiny. Rather, the
core issue concerns the availability of information
about public affairs. Many of the objections
raised to Red Lion are based on a somewhat disin-
genuous misinterpretation that the case concerns
spectrum scarcity. Spectrum scarcity is relevant
solely because it is an impediment to free access to
the fulfillment of underlying speech rights.
licensee shall, within 24 hours after the editorial, trans-
mit to respectively (i) the other qualified candidate or
candidates for the same office or (ii) the candidate op-
posed in the editorial . . . an offer of ... a reasonable
opportunity for a candidate or a spokesman of the can-
didate to respond over the licensee's facilities.
Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-75 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123,
73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1969)).
28 See generally Updated Comments Invited Regarding the
Personal Attack and Political Editorial Rules and Related
Pleadings, Public Notice, 12 FCC Rcd. 4688 (1996); see also
Commission Proceeding Regarding the Personal Attack and
Political Editorial Rules, Public Notice, (Aug. 8, 1997) <http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/Public Notices/1997/
pnmc70l5.html> (suspending rulemaking indefinitely be-
cause a majority of the Commission was unable to agree
upon any resolution of the issues).
29 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)
(1995)).
30 Id. at 389. The Court explained that the First Amend-
ment is not irrelevant to public broadcasting, as the above
quotation might lead one to believe. The Court emphasized
that the First Amendment plays a major role in public broad-
casting by forbidding FCC interference with the right of free
speech. See id. at 389-90.
31 See id. at 389-90 (citations omitted); see 47 U.S.C. § 326
(1994).
32 Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (citations omitted).
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Other technical impediments might possess
equally important constitutional significance.
The opinion's essence is that all must be allowed
an opportunity to speak in a democracy. More-
over, Red Lion begs a question: by what fair, im-
partial and content-neutral means should repre-
sentative viewpoints be determined, without active
government intervention?
This questions presents a dilemma. Govern-
ment intervention to improve discussion of public
affairs and promote viewpoint diversity is probably
an impermissible content-based distinction. 33 An-
tagonistic or diverse viewpoints in speech cannot
be determined without reference to content.
34
Therefore, under this constraint, is it possible to
craft a content-based preference for public inter-
est speech that could pass constitutional muster?
A potential solution to the problem of "be-
nign" intervention may be to assert that it is con-
stitutional for certain viewpoint neutral speech,
such as educational and informational program-
ming, to receive "encouragement," at the same
time that all other speech receives protection. So
long as such preferences are not viewpoint-based,
this distinction might not be considered inimical
to the Constitution.35  Affirmative action for
speech can be encouraged using the "oppression
vs. assistance" test that Justice Stevens posits in his
dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick.36 This
dissenting opinion, however, begs the question of
when programming can be characterized as infor-
mational or educational. This note does not at-
33 See Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. FCC, 105
F.3d 723, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en banc) [hereinafter "Time
Warner II"] (Williams, J., dissenting). "As a subject-matter
specification... the DBS requirement [, for example,] would
normally be 'content-based' and subject to strict scrutiny..
Id.
34 See id.
35 A regulation of this nature, however, should probably
be subjected to at least intermediate scrutiny. Both the
United States Supreme Court and courts of inferior jurisdic-
tion have, in the author's opinion, tended to conflate con-
tent-based and viewpoint-based analyses in order to overstate
the danger to free expression engendered by certain view-
point-neutral, content-based regulations like Section 25. The
failure to distinguish meaningfully between content-based
and viewpoint-based restrictions has led to much of the con-
fusion in this area of jurisprudence.
36 See 448 U.S. 448, 532-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) [hereinafter "Adarand"]. "The majority's concept of
.consistency' ignores a difference, fundamental to the idea of
equal protection, between oppression and assistance." Id. at
205.
tempt to answer these questions, although this ob-




Decided five years after Red Lion, Tornillo was as
critical of access regulation as Red Lion was sup-
portive. The Supreme Court's opinion in Tornillo
blurs the distinction between inclusive and exclu-
sive regulation, turning the First Amendment into
a zero-sum game where encouragement of one
form of speech results in censorship of all else
that might have occupied that time slot or place
on the page.
37
At issue in Tornillo was Florida's right of reply
statute, which provided that a personal attack by a
newspaper column against a candidate for nomi-
nation or election gave the candidate the right to
demand that the newspaper print, free of charge,
any reply the candidate may make to the charges
of a newspaper column.38 Advocates of the stat-
ute argued that economic changes in American
society had "place [d] in a few hands the power to
inform the American people and shape public
opinion."39 Nonetheless, the Court stated that a
legal "compulsion to publish that which 'reason'
tells them should not be published is unconstitu-
tional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly de-
sirable goal, but press responsibility is not man-
dated by the Constitution and like many other
-7 See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at
48-49 (ruling that government may not "restrict the speech of
some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others."); see also Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N.
Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 Nw. U. L. REv.
1487, 1506 (1995).
38 See FLA. STAT. ch. 104.38 (1974). Florida's "right of
reply" statute stated:
If any newspaper in its columns assails the personal char-
acter of any candidate for nomination or for election in
any election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance
or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks his official
record, or gives to another free space for such purpose,
such newspaper shall upon request of such candidate
immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make
thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind
of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided
such reply does not take up more space than the matter
replied to.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244-45 n.2.
39 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 241, 250 (citing BEN H. BAGDIKIAN,
THE INFORMATION MACHINES 127 (1971)); see also BEN H.
BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY, 216-17 (1983).
19981
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virtues, it cannot be legislated."40
Furthermore, the Court noted the possible chil-
ling effect that Florida's right-of-reply statute
might have on the newspaper owner's speech:
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any news-
paper that published news or commentary arguably
within reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might
well conclude that the safe course is to avoid contro-
versy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida
statute, political and electoral coverage would be
blunted or reduced.
4 1
It is difficult to distinguish Tornillo and Red Lion
on their facts, except by asserting, as an ipse dixit,
that print and broadcast media are "different" in a
constitutionally relevant fashion. 42 It is unfortu-
nate that Red Lion is not cited in Tornillo, and that
Red Lion does not cite to any print-medium right-
of-reply statutes to resolve this dichotomy between
print and broadcast media.
Tornillo asserts that a violation of the First
Amendment occurs, regardless of form or intent,
when the government trespasses on the proprie-
tary right of the owner/speaker. In the Tornillo
Court's view, whether the speaker presents news,
political invective, hate speech, violence, fluff or
prurience, or whether the speaker is an individ-
ual, a television network, a newspaper conglomer-
ate or a cable company, the First Amendment
prohibits virtually all government-erected barriers
to entry into the marketplace of ideas. 43 Individu-
als choosing not to speak, whether they lack the
desire or financial ability, should not be com-
pelled or encouraged to speak using the resources
of another.
44
40 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
41 Id. at 257.
42 Arguably, one difference might be the use of govern-
mental property (electromagnetic spectrum) as an input of
production.
43 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 255 (quoting Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)
[hereinafter "Columbia"]) "The power of a privately owned
newspaper to advance its own political, social, and economic
views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of
a sufficient number of readers - and hence advertisers - to
assure financial success; and, second, the journalistic integ-
rity of its editors and publishers." Id.
44 The Tornillo Court continued:
the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a
reply is exacted in terms of the cost of printing and com-
posing time and materials and in taking up space that
could be devoted to other material the newspaper may
have preferred to print. [A] newspaper is not subject to
the finite technological limitations of time that confront
a broadcaster but it is not correct to say that, as an eco-
IV. DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE
PROGRAMMERS, SECTION 25 AND NON-
CONTINGENT SET-ASIDES
The resource question is the crux of both Red
Lion and Tornillo. The resource question also
gave rise to the debate over the future of Section
25 of the 1992 Cable Act, which added Section
335 to the Communications Act of 1934. Section
335 required the Commission to implement rules
mandating a minimum level of political program-
ming by DBS providers. 4 5 The provision also re-
quired DBS providers to set aside channels for
noncommercial educational and informational
programming at reasonable rates.
4 6
The Commission initiated a rulemaking to im-
plement the statute in March 1993. 47 Shortly
thereafter, a coalition of video industry plaintiffs
brought suit against the Commission, challenging
the constitutionality, not only of Section 25, but
also of several sections of the 1992 Cable Act and
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.48
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia issued an injunction staying the
rulemaking proceeding and struck down the pro-
vision later that year.
49
The District Court's rationale for striking down
Section 25 was simple. The court held that Con-
gress failed to make any record indicating that
"regulation of DBS service providers is necessary
to serve any significant regulatory or market-bal-
ancing interest."50 In the absence of a record, the
opinion stated, it was unnecessary to determine
nomic reality, a newspaper can proceed to infinite ex-
pansion of its column space to accommodate the replies
that a government agency determines or a statute com-
mands the readers should have available.
Id. at 256-57 (emphasis omitted).
45 See 47 U.S.C. § 335(a) (1994).
46 See 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(1)-(3) (1994).
47 See In re Implementation of Section 25 of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, Direct Broadcast Satellite Public Service Obligations,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 FCC Rcd. 1589, para. 1 (1993).
48 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (1984) (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521 et
seq. (1994)); see Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 1.
49 See Daniels, 835 F. Supp. at 8 (ruling that the provi-
sions in the 1992 Cable Act seem to be unconstitutional be-
cause either they "impose content-related burdens on
speech" or they do not serve any significant regulatory pur-
pose to justify the "burdens they impose" on speech).
50 Id.
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whether the statute was content-neutral or con-
tent-based, because under either standard the
government would be unable to demonstrate that
the need was compelling, important or even ra-
tional.
51
The Commission appealed to the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit and oral arguments were
presented in November 1994. The panel in this
case reviewed the issues for almost two years. Fi-
nally, in August 1996, the District of Columbia
Circuit overturned the District Court's ruling, cit-
ing Red Lion at length for the proposition that the
scarcity of satellite orbital slots was analogous to
the shortage of television frequencies in Red
Lion.52 The Circuit Court explicitly acknowledged
that it balanced the First Amendment rights of
broadcasters against those of the viewer 53 and the
balance conclusively tilted toward the rights of the
viewer.
54
However, neither the regulation nor its under-
lying justification are content-neutral. In addition
to the statute's facial references to "noncommer-
cial educational and informational programming"
and "national educational programming services,"
the court cites a chain of First Amendment cases
that reference the communication's diversity,
multiplicity of sources and balanced presentation
on issues of public importance. 55 The court ruled
that the saving grace of the set-aside was the tre-
mendous number of channels under the DBS op-
erator's editorial control. 56 As with Turner II, the
provisions "leave [DBS] operators free to carry
whatever programming they wish on all channels
not subject to [the set-aside] requirements.
'" 57
51 See id.
52 See Time Warner I, 93 F.3d at 975.
53 See id. (citing Columbia, 412 U.S. 94, 102-103).
54 See id. (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390 (holding that
"[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of
the broadcasters, which is paramount .... It is the right of
the public to receive suitable access to social, political, es-
thetic .... and other ideas .. .which is crucial.")).
55 See id. at 976-77 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 335(b)(2)
(1994)).
56 See id. at 976. The Court focused on the fact that the
government does not direct the content of the programming
that DBS operators must cary. The Court further stated:
[t]he design and operation of the challenged provisions
confirm that the purposes underlying [their] enactment
... are unrelated to the content of speech. The rules
[under Section 25] . . .do not require or prohibit the
carriage of particular ideas or points of view. They do
not penalize [DBS] operators or programmers because
of the content of their programming. They do not com-
pel [DBS] operators to affirm points of view with which
In February 1997, the, D.C. Circuit denied Time
Warner's request for a rehearing en banc.5 Five
judges, however, signed a dissenting opinion
which discussed the infirmity of the spectrum
scarcity doctrine and implied that the number of
channels on a DBS system militated toward strict
scrutiny, not away from it. 5 9 Where the panel de-
cision counted the limited number of satellite po-
sitions and determined that access was scarce,
Judge Williams and the dissenting members of the
D.C. Circuit counted the total channels available
and came to the opposite conclusion. 60 Time
Warner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. Hence, a
definitive answer from the highest Court in the
land about whether certain types of speech can be
preferred for set-aside purposes is still pending.
V. GOVERNMENT-PROVIDED SPEECH
FORUMS -PUBLIC BROADCASTING
Presently, educational, cultural and public af-
fairs programming continue to receive federal
funding through the various public broadcasting
acts. 61 The goals behind public broadcasting re-
main worth pursuing: to create an information
system responsive to the interests of people lo-
cated throughout the United States and to facili-
tate the development of programming which ex-
presses "diversity and excellence." 62
Unfortunately, federal cutbacks and relaxed stan-
dards for noncommercial underwriting have
made public broadcasting look and behave simi-
lar to its for-profit brethren.63
they disagree .... Because Section 25 is 'a reasonable
means of promoting the public in diversified mass com-
munications,' it does not violate the First Amendment
rights of DBS providers.
Id. at 977.
57 Time Warner I, 93 F.3d at 977 (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645-49 (1994) [hereinafter
"Turner I"]).
58 See Time Warner II, 105 F.3d. at 724.
59 See id. at 724.
60 See id. at 725. The five dissentingjudges stated that at
the time of this opinion, there were four DBS providers, with
each providing between 45 and 75 video channels, and 30
music channels. Hence, the Judges concluded, "Red Lion's
factual predicate - scarcity of channels - is absent here." Id.
61 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1994) (codifying the funding, legisla-
tive intent and restrictions regarding federally subsidized
public radio and television broadcasting).
62 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (5) (1994).
63 See, e.g., Paul Fahri, Seeking a Word from Their Sponsors,
WASH. PosT, Aug. 11, 1997, at 17. For example, public broad-
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It is not constitutionally suspect for the govern-
ment to create and distribute its own special inter-
est and educational television and radio pro-
grams; indeed, this was the idea behind creating
the Corporation for Public Broadcasting
("CPB") .64 CPB could continue as an appropriate
vehicle for funding speech from diverse and an-
tagonistic sources, however it is currently under
political attack for exactly that reason.65
In oftder for the programming on public broad-
casting to become more inclusive of diverse voices
and viewpoints, San Francisco telecommunica-
tions attorney Christopher Witteman suggests that
CPB structure its governance according to a
model provided by the West German broadcast-
ing system. 66 In this system, local public broad-
casting stations are run by boards of directors, re-
quired by law to be official representatives of a
diverse range of political, religious, labor, busi-
ness, youth, arts and educational groups. 67 A stat-
utory requirement, like that of the West German
system, that the boards of local public broadcast-
ing stations be comprised of representatives from
specific non-profit and governmental entities may
create a more diverse programming lineup for lo-
cal stations. On a national level, a board com-
prised of such diverse representatives might be an
appropriate administrative body for DBS's non-
profit set-aside.
However, while programming created under
such a system might be more representative of the
wide-ranging interests of the population, even
under this model, "it]he problem of providing
public broadcasting with a [politically] insulated
source of income still remains."68 Indeed, the
funding problem faced by CPB is even more pro-
nounced with the DBS public interest set-aside,
which makes no provision for funding the produc-
tion and distribution of the educational and infor-
mational programming that Congress has man-
dated.
casting companies have begun to hire prominent sales firms
to market them. See id.
64 See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMMISSION, A PUBLIC TRUST: THE
REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF PUB-
LIC BROADCASTING 41-59 (1979).
65 See Christopher Witteman, West German Television Law:
An Argument for Media as an Instrument of Self-Government, 7
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 145, 204 (1983) [hereinafter
Witteman].
66 See generally id. at 207; see also Sunstein, supra note 15,
at 1778 n.88.
67 See Witteman, supra note 65, at 162, n.130.
VI. CONCLUSION - TOWARD AN "EQUAL
PROTECTION" INTERPRETATION OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The end of physical scarcity in a variety of elec-
tronic media 69 could present a real opportunity
for an explosion in the diversity of communica-
tion. Insofar as governments possess the ability to
reserve carriage capacity for themselves, they can
act to relieve market failure without falling prey to
the accusation that they are commandeering the
electronic media's editorial control of govern-
mental speech. The DBS non-commercial set-
aside provision permits the federal government to
encourage its preferred speech without dictating
content to private parties. Applying this principle
to broadcast entities may be appropriate as broad-
cast television stations convert to digital transmis-
sion and begin to "multiplex" their spectrum into
multiple discrete channels.
70
The phenomenal growth of the Internet dem-
onstrates that individuals have been waiting for an
electronic medium of mass communication, and
finally, entry barriers are low enough to permit
millions of people to participate. 71 The Internet,
however, has not made the access concerns of Red
Lion obsolete. In fact, the concerns are more rele-
vant than ever; while the Internet has permitted
greater individual self-expression, the monopoli-
zation of the dominant media by large commer-
cial entities has occurred and continues to oc-
cur. 7 2 Consequently, the convergence of
television and the Internet may drown individual
voices in a sea of commercial Internet program-
ming.
In the end, the real issue that permeates both
Red Lion and Tornillo is money; specifically, money
that makes mass communication possible. Red
Lion, Tornillo and the Time Warner II en banc dis-
sent are simply San Antonio Independent School Dis-
68 Id. at 207, n.532.
69 Including, inter alia, DBS, broadcast television, and the
Internet.
70 See Kyle Pope, High-Definition TV is Dealt A Setback,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1997, at B5.
71 See Brenner, supra note 16, at 1032 (concluding that
"[t] he Internet may be the greatest equalizer of communica-
tions yet devised."); see Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1781-84.
72 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1783 (discussing that
with Internet use, citizens are able to express their views and
receive answers more effectively, particularly in the political
context).
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trict v. Rodriguez7 3 dressed up in First Amendment
clothing. This is the reason that cases such as
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena,74 which discuss
inclusion and exclusion, deprivation and access,
resonate so strongly in this line of jurisprudence.
The right of reply, PEG access and the DBS set-
aside statutes represent attempts to give all Ameri-
cans the same right to speak and be heard that
Rupert Murdoch, Ted Turner and Michael Eisner
enjoy.75 Voting and speech, two quintessentially
political rights embraced by all Americans, must
be available on a more-or-less equal basis if our
formal political egalitarianism is to have any
meaning.
As a political matter, it is understandable that
governmental entities prefer private entities to
bear the costs of equal protection in the speech
market. Requiring corporate entities to provide
for a speech costs less than government subsi-
dized speech and avoids the inevitable political
problems that have dogged both the CPB and the
NEA in subsidizing speech that someone, some-
where, does not like.
However, American jurisprudence has continu-
ally declined to acknowledge that equal protec-
tion under the law is at least partially dependent
on equal access to financial and physical re-
sources. 76 The conservative position is that view-
point scarcity created by economic scarcity is not
relevant to the meaning of the First Amend-
ment.77 This viewpoint, which purports to leave
the First Amendment to the market, assumes that
freedom of speech could still be considered an
equal right, not withstanding its practical unavail-
ability.
The proprietary view of the First Amendment
fails to acknowledge its political significance; it is
just another principle of property law. When
placing the commercial marketplace ahead of the
marketplace of ideas, the equal protection con-
73 See 411 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1973) (stating that wealth is not
a suspect classification and does not provide an "adequate
basis for invoking strict scrutiny", differences in wealth which
impact legal rights are not a violation of the Equal Protection
clause).
74 See generally 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
75 See, e.g., Note, The Message in the Medium: The First
Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARv. L. REv.
1062, 1075-77 (1994); see David Ehrenfest Steinglass, Ex-
tending PruneYard: Citizens' Right to Demand Public Access Cable
Channels, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1113, 1145 n.158 (1996) [herein-
after "Steinglass"]; see Witteman, supra note 65, at 157; see
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 1792-94; see Fowler, supra note 22,
at 223 (discussing economic resources' effects on First
text of the First Amendment is not served and the
political process is manipulated in support of non-
egalitarian outcomes. Both results are undesir-
able. In the same way that affirmative action was
designed to redistribute economic power to disad-
vantaged groups, Red Lion's goal was to distribute
political power to the same disadvantaged groups.
A serious commitment to CPB and its extension
to other electronic media, or the extension of
public access principles to terrestrial broadcast
stations would contribute significantly to equal
protection concerns. Moreover, the recently an-
nounced plans of ABC and Sinclair Broadcasting
to multiplex their digital signals78 suggests that a
modest set aside of digital spectrum as a condition
of license may be a worthwhile policy objective.
Such a policy would improve access to informa-
tion and impose minimal speech interference
upon licensees.
In enacting protective legislation for speech,
governments could rely on their general authority
to regulate business if reliance upon the implicit
Equal Protection facet of the First Amendment is
insufficient.7 9 The Supreme Court's decisions in
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission§° and Dolan
v. City of Tigard"' permit local governments to re-
quire in-kind compensation in connection with
the costs of regulation if the "roughly proportion-
ate" nexus between the governmental interest at
stake and the extent to which the value of the reg-
ulated property may be diminished.8 2 In a world
in which the amount of bandwidth available for
communications has increased dramatically, own-
ers of the electronic media will find it more and
more difficult to make the case that set-aside regu-
lation is a regulatory burden that amounts to a
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment.8 3
Turner I and Turner II represent the proposition
that structural regulation of the speech market
can withstand scrutiny if its language is content-
Amendment rights).
76 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 272-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 117-24 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
77 See, e.g., Krattenmaker, supra note 11, at 1731 (stating
that the First Amendment is best served by a process of "bid-
ding" for information and entertainment).
78 See Pope, supra note 70, at B5.
79 See, e.g., Steinglass, supra note 75, at 1157-58.
80 See 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
81 See 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
82 Id. at 2317-20.
83 See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see generally Nollan, 483 U.S.
825; see generally Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309.
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neutral.8 4 Although the D.C. Circuit's current po-
sition includes approving at least some content-
based distinctions, the issue has not been an-
swered definitively by the Supreme Court.
Tornillo, however, suggests that the Federal Gov-
ernment cannot step in and dictate to private
speakers the programming that, in the govern-
ment's view, would best serve the public interest,
even assuming that such programming could be
clearly identified. 5 Set-asides solve this problem.
Governmental entities, particularly the Federal
Government, could issue licenses to itself and
fund itself, or seek compensation from spectrum
users. As long as a sufficient nexus exists between
the compensation sought and the activity being
regulated, 6 there should be no objection to re-
ceiving in-kind compensation for taxes, licensing
fees, auction proceeds or other, payments.
Is there a sufficient nexus to prevent Section 25
from turning into a "takings" case dressed in First
Amendment clothing? Probably, but the basis to
defend this kind of statute, that set-asides are
compensation or part of a licensing fee, should be
clearly stated rather than turned into an ambigu-
ous and conflicted "right to hear."
84 See Turner/, 512 U.S. at 662-63; see Turner II, 117 S. Ct.
at 1186.
85 SeegenerallyTornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
s6 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317-
Red Lion conveys the message that there is no
constitutional right to a twenty-four hour a day,
seven day a week license; nor is there a constitu-
tional right to provide a communications service
without providing some compensation to the gov-
ernmental entity whose property makes the com-
munications service possible. A modest set-aside
of capacity does not infringe multi-channel prov-
iders' speech rights because the provider remains
capable of speaking from the vast majority of
channels. Its analogue is putting aside land in a
development for public parks as part of a munici-
pality's approval of a subdivision of land. 7 There
is no intrusion that forces the operator to change
her message or chill speech that she may or may
not choose to make on her remaining channels.88
Set-asides like those created by Section 25 serve
both the First Amendment and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause by guaranteeing that more would-be
speakers will be granted the opportunity to join in
the exercise of one of our most important consti-
tutional rights.
20.
87 See Denver, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
88 See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 652, 663.
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